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Abstract
Starting from the comparisons of international industrialization history, we suggested
that the successful successor economic entities have experienced significant economic
fallouts when GDP per capita reached US$11,000 after rapid economic growth resulting
from the condensed development. By learning from the international empirical evidence
and by analyzing China’s potential for growth, we suggested that China will enter
slow growth stage around year 2015. Therefore, the current development mode has to
change in terms of growth structure and economic system.
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China’s economy has grown rapidly for more than 30 years, but how much longer can
it last? China is fortunate to have sustained such rapid economic growth over such a
long period, but it does not take a genius to realize that it will not last forever. The
only questions are when will it end, what form will the economy assume when it ends,
and what will the repercussions be? Yet, another concern is whether China will become
stuck in the middle-income trap. When China’s GDP per capita reaches US$4000, the
middle-income trap will be upon us.
Two long-term tasks
Economic growth has been a hot topic among academics. With the onset of globalization,
the growth of China’s real economy has become of major importance to the global econ-
omy. Research on this topic must be based on international comparisons. In the begin-
ning of our research, we had two far-reaching tasks to accomplish. One was building an
economic indicator database for dozens of industrialized countries and regions. These
data came from different sources, and as such, we had to organize our research systemat-
ically. This was a time consuming and complex task, and our group dedicated much
effort to this project. The database made our research much easier to conduct. Within
the database, regularities and typical phenomena became observable. This database
should prove useful to future research as well.
Choosing the most appropriate benchmark from various international indicators was
another task. For instance, we had to decide whether to use current US$ accounting or
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purchasing power parity for calculations. Determining the specific accounting method for
the latter was yet another issue. After serious contemplation, we adopted Angus Maddison’s
long-term economic growth indicator at 1990 prices as our benchmark. Not only is this a
universally recognized indicator, but the wide range and time scope of this method allowed
us to compare data across national boundaries and time periods. Also, this method handles
important physical output indicators better than other indicators.
Discoveries about the “condensed development model” of economic growth
We began our analysis with research on the industrialization process and on empirical
evidence. We classified the industrialized countries and regions in the database into the
following five categories: (1) leading nations in technological advances, such as the UK
and the USA; (2) technologically advanced countries such as European nations; (3) East
Asian countries which have grown rapidly and are trying to spur innovations; (4) nations
which employed an export substitution strategy but got stuck in the middle-income trap,
such as Latin American nations and some Southeast Asian nations; and (5) nations
employing a central planned economy which experienced rapid growth for a long time but
which eventually fell into the middle-income trap, such as former Soviet Union countries
or Eastern European countries. In all of these nations, at different times, there have been
forerunners and followers, newcomers, and failures.
In our research of international comparisons, we made what we call several “typical
observances”. Here, we use the term “typical” instead of “regular” because these obser-
vances popped up frequently within our research, but we are still not sure of the exact
underlying reasons. The term “typical observances” much better describes the findings
of our research.
First, we observed the fallout that occurs after rapid “condensed development model”
economic growth. Compared to leader countries, follower countries generally industrialize
over a much shorter time period. The later the country begins, the shorter the time period
it uses to industrialize. For example, it took Japan only about 70 years to industrialize to
the same level as the UK and the USA, both of which spent hundreds of years in the
process. South Korea and other East Asian nations took only 50 years. China and some
more developed inland regions may require an even shorter time. We adopted the term
“condensed development model” growth to describe this phenomenon. The rate of eco-
nomic growth seems to be higher during “the condensed development”, but once the
economy can be condensed no longer, the bottom falls out of the growth rate. In the past,
economic growth theories were mostly concerned with the occurrence of rapid growth.
Now, we need not only to address the ensuing economic fallout, but we must also fully
dissect the process of rapid economic growth during “the condensed development”.
Second, we observed two different types of fallout that occur after the industrialization
process. In one, the economy falls out and becomes stuck in the middle-income trap. Latin
American countries are the typical example. In former Soviet and Eastern Bloc nations,
economic growth dropped out dramatically after the mid 1970s. This is considered a differ-
ent kind of middle-income trap. The latter middle-income trap, however, has not been
mentioned much in economic research. Interestingly, this kind of fallout first appeared
during the Soviet Union era of strong central economic planning. This demonstrates that
no matter how solid a country’s institutions seem, when they fail, the economy is bound to
experience fallout. A different type of fallout occurred in successful successor nations such
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as Germany, Japan, South Korea, and other new East Asian economies. These economies
started to fall off after they had fully realized their potential of rapid growth. To a certain
extent, this kind of fallout presages an economy’s transition from a period of rapid growth
into a period of medium growth and high income.
In straight forward terms, these two types of fallout share some traits, including a
period of rapid growth before fallout. What matters is their intrinsic differences. For
the middle-income trap group, GDP per capita at the time of the fallout for Latin
American countries was around 4000 to 6000 international dollars and around 5000 to
7000 international dollars for former Soviet Union countries. The economies of suc-
cessful successor countries fell out with GDP per capita near 11,000 international dol-
lars. The former group lost the control of their economies during the period of rapid
economic growth. The latter group, however, experienced fallout after they had fully
exploited their economic growth capacities. What is more important is that both Latin
American and former Soviet nations had intrinsic flaws in their institutions, policies,
and economic strategies at the time they entered the middle-income trap. These flaws
effectively predetermined the falling out of their economic growth. As for the successful
successors, those nations avoided institutional flaws on their roads to industrialization.
In our study, we built a model based on “six factors” to explore possible explanations
for these observations.
One issue to be explored is the relationship between external factors and decelerating
economic growth. Empirical evidence demonstrates that some nations’ economies deceler-
ated as a result of significant external factors. In Latin America, economic stagnation was
accompanied by the 1980s debt crisis. Japan’s economy slowed down at the time of the oil
crisis and the breakdown of the Breton Woods system during the 1970s. South Korea’s
economy slowed down in the face of the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. The ques-
tion then is: without significant external impacts, would those countries have experienced
their fallout? Or more to the point, were their fallouts the result of external or internal fac-
tors? We previously thought that deceleration was mainly caused by internal factors and
that external factors exerted only an amplifying effect. The debt crisis in Latin American
nations was mainly caused by institutional and structural deficiencies, while former Soviet
Union nations appeared generally unaffected by debt crises as a result of strong, centrally
planned economies. Successful successor countries like Japan and South Korea were both
affected by the 1970s oil crisis and both relied heavily on imported energy. Japan’s economy
began to slide immediately, whereas the South Korean economy took another 20 years to
show signs of slowing. The underlying reason for this is that Japan’s rapid economic growth
period ended in the early 1970s, while South Korea’s ended in the mid 1990s.
Third, the deceleration of the economies of successful successor countries was accom-
panied by massive adjustments to their economic structures. During rapid growth periods,
those nations were typically ramping up industrialization, which at the time was the prime
driver of growth. During the middle and later periods, heavy industry developed even fas-
ter, and the heavy and chemical industries together drove economic growth. Massive
resources were invested into roundabout production. The agricultural sector accounted for
smaller and smaller proportions of economic growth, while the service industry started to
grow but was not yet the leading driver of growth. Within this economic structure, invest-
ments were kept high to support demand, while demand for consumption was kept at a
lower level. When rapid growth was near ending, the economic structures also changed
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dramatically. Industry’s proportion within the economy decreased, and was replaced by the
service sector, which then became the main driver of growth. Then, investments decreased
and consumption increased. During the transformation, however, it was not that the ser-
vice sector grew more efficient than the industrial sector, but rather that the slowing down
of industrial growth made the growth of the service industry seem faster in comparison.
Investment and consumption also switched places, in relative terms, at the end of the
transformation.
Fourth, as economic growth slows, and growth drivers are replaced, the issue we
need to face is how to transform our economic growth model. Deceleration is the result
of dramatic changes occurring within the structure of the economy and is just one face
of the sweeping changes happening now. Outside of the economic structure, there are
great changes happening within supply and demand. With demand becoming sluggish,
the costs of factor inputs such as labor, land, and resources are rising fast. Direct use of
technology has become scarce, and the older segments of the population have low sav-
ings rates. These all lead to one question: can we keep productivity at a reasonable
level? It would seem that the existing growth mode is no longer capable of adapting to
our changing economic structure and changing factor inputs. Even for successful
nations, transforming the mode of economic growth is never smooth. The transform-
ation requires thorough adjustments to institutions, strategies, and policies, and the
process has never been easy. Japan, for example, implemented macro-expansionary pol-
icies in an effort to restore economic growth rates to previous levels, but that ended in
failure, with a huge asset bubble and soaring national debt. Nevertheless, these nations
have gradually transitioned to innovation-driven growth modes, fostering a number of
high quality industries and enterprises to compete in the global market.
Time windows for China’s slowing economy
Using the typical observations discussed above as our foundation, we will now discuss the
course of Chinese industrialization and its economic growth in terms of China’s historical
background.
China has experienced a growth rate of 10 percent over the past 30 years, making China
a typical case of the “condensed development model” of growth. Research on China’s
impending economic fallout should take into consideration every aspect of China’s eco-
nomic growth mode. We have adopted three different but mutually verifiable calculation
methods and have concluded that China’s economy may enter a fallout period in 2015 or
somewhere within the time window from 2013 to 2017. When the fallout occurs, eco-
nomic growth may fall by as much as 30 percent, from 10 to 7 percent.
An important task we face is estimating China’s GDP per capita, or in other words, to
see where we are economically. Recent studies on the middle-income trap usually suggest
that Latin American nations fell into the middle-income trap after their GDP per capita
reached US$4000. Now, China’s per capita GDP is at that very level, and so it would seem
that our country is also in the trap. We reckon that this logic is straightforward but mis-
leading. As stated above, we have adopted credible indicators using international dollars
suggested by Angus Maddison and have compared different methods for deriving accur-
ate comparisons across nations and time. We have concluded that China’s GDP per capita
is nearly 8000 international dollars, much higher than that of Latin American nations.
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Different measurements of GDP per capita would result in different definitions of the
problem.
Another question is how to apply international experience to the enormous Chinese
economy. China’s population is greater than the combined populations of all OECD
member countries. According to the latest demographic statistics, the populations of
27 provinces (including provincial-level municipalities and autonomous regions) out of
31 exceed 10 million, with the top ten over 50 million, and the top three near or over a
100 million. Many of the world’s large economies are similar to one of China’s prov-
inces in term of population size. And as China’s various regions have developed at very
different paces, China could be considered a whole world unto itself. To make Chinese
data comparable with the international statistics, we have classified our provincial-level
districts into several categories. For instance, big cities like Beijing and Shanghai are
equivalent to city-state economic entities such as Singapore and Hong Kong. Those
provinces with better economic conditions and large populations are similar to Japan
and South Korea. The rest of the provinces with poorer economic conditions are similar
to less developed countries. Overall statistics from each province can then be organized
into a comprehensive whole for analyzing the overall national economy.
Frankly speaking, predicting future economic prospects has always been a dirty job.
We can only hope that China will maintain a growth rate around 10 percent for thirty
more years, or even longer. However, we must admit that fallout is inevitable after a
condensed development model economy such as our own reaches a certain threshold.
It is, however, never enough to simply point out future trends. What we must do is to
use thorough analysis to predict the fallout’s time window. In fact, all we can do is to
estimate the time window, which we place in approximately 2015 or from 2013 to
2017. It is probable that the fallout will occur during that window, but no matter when
the fallout comes, it will not be unexpected. After 30 years of rapid economic growth,
however, this window of 4 years should be far from a rough guess.
Understanding adjustments to the economic structure from the perspective
of the stage of development
What is more important is that through research of the economic fallouts in the late
period of condensed development model, we are able to deepen our understanding of
the structure of our economy and its prospects for adjustment and development.
The structures of industry, investments, and consumption are often the main topics
when discussing the economic structure. In the condensed development model of growth,
the high ratio occupied by the industrial sector within the economic structure and the high
ratio of investment to consumption are closely related to rapid economic growth at the
macro-economic level. An analysis of China’s growth data over the past few years demon-
strates that it was consumption, not net exports, that grew steadily. It was the ratio of
investment that drove growth, and that ratio was closely related to the ratio of the indus-
trial structure within the economy. Due to institutional factors, there were indeed prob-
lematically high ratios of both industry and investments within economic growth, but it is
not easy to distinguish between “a high ratio” and “a high but normal ratio”. When con-
densed development model growth ends and economic growth slows, the proportion of
industries and investments in economic growth gradually decline. At the same time, the
proportion of the service sector and consumptions both rises. It is worth mentioning that
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this structural adjustment stems from slower industrial growth and investment growth, not
from the increasing proportion of the service sector and consumption within the economy.
Therefore, the growth of the economy as a whole is declining. When rapid growth persists,
manipulating the proportions of investments and the industrial sector growth in order to
improve the economic structure results in neither a rational economic structure nor
increased benefits. Instead, growth slows down, and companies’ profitability and financial
conditions worsen. It is worth noting that China has this in common with Latin American
nations now stuck in the middle-income trap. However, when rapid growth cools off, the
economic structure will naturally change on its own.
There is another question we must address: how should we position China’s indus-
tries in the future, especially in the manufacturing sector? We think that we should
learn lessons from developed countries which overdid de-industrialization, thereby hol-
lowing out their industrial structures. Even if China’s manufacturing sector declines in
the future, we should try to prevent the decline from being too dramatic, and keep its
ratio at around 30 percent. In order to stimulate production, increase efficiency, and
upgrade our industries, we should focus on productive services such as R&D, finance,
logistics, training, information services, and post-sale service when developing the ser-
vice industry. There is one more issue China needs to tackle into for the nation to have
competitive advantages in every sector, but rather only in some sectors. It will be much
more important for China to cultivate her competitiveness, and after that, the period of
rapid economic expansion is over. However, it is the market that determines which
industries stay. In the foreseeable future, it might be the manufacturing sector, and not
the service sector, that is competitive. Therefore, China needs a strong and competitive
manufacturing sector in order to compete in the global market.
Assessing our existing growth mode
In order to transition into a new mode of development, we must first assess our
current mode of development. It indeed is important to objectively evaluate China’s
growth mode from a historical perspective. If one calls China’s economic growth over
the past 30 years a miracle, then it is not justified to say in the same breath that China’s
growth mode was outdated or a failure. In fact, it is not difficult to observe the differ-
ences between China and other developing countries on a global scale. For example,
the Chinese social consensus of “development is the absolute principle” has been over-
taken by “scientific development,” prompting effective market reforms through the pol-
icies of “crossing the river by feeling the stones,” and “dual systems.” In another
example, when the government implemented a foreign policy of opening up to the out-
side on many levels, China became more deeply involved in the international division
of labor. And even with the world’s largest population, China has built a market system
that is at least mutually sustainable across its regions if not entirely balanced. And yet,
another example is how China keeps both its society and political situation stable while
pushing forward both reforms and development.
Local competition is the most significant characteristic of the Chinese domestic eco-
nomic system. Among provinces, cities, counties, and even local governments, there is
competition for external resources to increase local investments and improve development
conditions. As long as there is a political institution, there will be another entity to compete
with it. This special structure is the result of a marriage between Chinese traditional
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governance and the market economy. When the market drives goods and resources across
regions, a tough government shows its strength by organizing resources that improve infra-
structure, by offering credit to dealers, by improving the quality of local factors, and by
improving government efficiency. Such strengths are revealed in the early stages of
industrialization. Competition among local governments has caused these institutions to be-
come resources in themselves. It is worth noting that a “development-oriented government”
is not pre-planned but rather comes together naturally. This has been the exact case in
China.
As a matter of fact, we still have not learned enough from China’s current mode of eco-
nomic development. We know that we are reaping the benefits of miraculous sustained
high growth, but we are still trying to figure out why. However, for the moment, it is pos-
sible for us to quickly rule out some important factors. For instance, some consider the fact
that the Chinese economy is mainly driven by high savings rates, high investment rates,
and high growth rates as problems. If we investigate most other developing countries,
those traits are precisely what they lack in the long run and are hard to foster if they do
not occur naturally.
Of course, we cannot discount the flaws within China’s economic growth model. The
question now is how to understand those flaws. It is well known that the current devel-
opment model has created certain unbalanced situations, including internal and exter-
nal imbalances, imbalances between investment and consumption, imbalances among
economic sectors, imbalances in development between regions and income inequalities.
The real question is whether these imbalances are themselves the root problems or if
they merely reflect deeper issues. We believe that we need to focus on the deeper
issues. Currently, there are two issues of great concern. One is market distortion of
energy, land, finance and labor, which result in poor resource distribution and struc-
tural imbalances. For example, distortion within the factors market has led to increased
competitiveness of exports and a high proportion of energy-consuming industries. The
other is the state-dominated economic system characterized by both the monopolistic
non-trade sector (which includes state-owned enterprises) and the competitive trade
sector (which includes private enterprises). The former is mainly engaged in basic
industries while the latter is mainly composed of export-driven companies. Many stud-
ies have shown that the former usually obtains large amounts of resources but displays
relatively low productivity and higher financial risks than the latter. It is the latter that
drives Chinese competitiveness.
Both the flaws and the advantages of our current development mode are really two sides
of the same coin, a coin that got flipped when the government began intervening in
resource distribution. When the government was creating rapid growth, internal imbal-
ances occurred. When the government was encouraging investments, rapid growth was
no longer possible. Ideally, we should remove all the bad things and keep all the good
things within our development mode via deepening reforms, and we should maintain
rapid growth by correcting imbalances. Those reforms have not achieved their expected
results, but rapid growth continues nonetheless. We, therefore, need to pay close attention
to another characteristic of the current development mode, i.e., that rapid growth helps to
eliminate imbalances, low efficiency, and potential risks. Bad assets left over from the
banking reforms of the late 1990s all disappeared during the period of rapid growth, and
China responded to the international financial crisis by ramping up investments. As long
Liu China Finance and Economic Review  (2015) 3:10 Page 7 of 9
as there is a potential for rapid growth, it is certain that the Chinese economy cannot be
stopped from growing rapidly.
Challenges posed by the “expiration date” of the current growth model
The next question facing Chinese leadership is what will happen if rapid growth cannot
continue? Here, the end of rapid growth refers to economic fallout, not economic ma-
nipulation. We think that when this happens, China will face harsh challenges from two
sides.
The first is the exposure of contradictions and risks originally covered up by rapid
economic growth. Some may be revealed when economic growth slows, while some
others may be exposed during asset re-assessments triggered by changing expectations
for growth. If over-consumption in the USA triggered the subprime crisis, then China
will have to prepare for similar risks or even a crisis precipitated by excessive and
improper investments.
The second is that economic fallout may not only mean a different growth rate but
also a different economic structure and a different driver of growth. Cultivating a new
economic growth driver is a challenge faced by all countries that have been through
this stage of economic transformation. However, the issues China will face in trans-
forming the drivers of its economic growth will be different from those faced by other
countries before it.
Roughly speaking, when the fallout comes, China will have to deal with two chal-
lenges, one in risk management and the other in transforming the primary growth
driver. This paper has listed a series of questions that must be answered. They are as
follows: Can China effectively prevent and mitigate risks to the fiscal (governmental)
and finance sectors during economic fallout? Can Chinese companies adjust to a slower
growth rate and adapt slower profit models? Can the government adjust macro-
economic controls and reevaluate goals? Will a more efficient market form, bringing
with it a group of large innovative companies and small and medium competitive enter-
prises? Will that market be able to foster competitive technology and service sectors?
Could the government further open markets, reduce restrictions on monopolistic
industries, especially entry restrictions in the service sector, and give the service sector
more space to develop? Could the government deregulate more higher education insti-
tutions in order to adjust to the new social order? Could the government promote fas-
ter growth of the middle class by promoting employment, innovation, and income
redistribution reforms? Could the government create a modern financial system, one
that is adaptable, innovative, and efficient at distributing and preventing risks? Could
the government walk away from its role of dominating economic growth and focus on
mainly providing public services?
We can break down the issues that come with the transformation of our growth
mode into the following three categories: structural, institutional, and time-sensitive.
Structural problems represent the outer layer, as they result from a series of imbalances.
The middle layer is occupied by institutional problems caused by distortions in resource
distribution. It is worth noting that in some cases, certain traits within the institutional
structure may be considered both advantages and disadvantages. Although the public
expects reforms that reward merit and punish failure, the fact is that there is limited room
for this kind of reform to take place. However, if there is still potential for rapid growth,
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our economy will continue to grow rapidly, regardless of what anybody says. This goes to
show that our current mode of growth is highly adaptive, as it not only maintains rapid
growth, but more importantly, accommodates serious imbalances, low efficiency, and hid-
den risks. This is what we mean by “time-sensitive”.
The point we are trying to make in this paper is that when time runs out on those
time-sensitive factors, the nation will need not only to face the problems that will
accompany economic fallout, but will also need to develop a new mode of growth that
is suitable for the next stage of our development. This is the historical mission of the
coming round of reforms in China.
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